1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	J. Henk Taylor, A.Z. Bar #016321 RYAN RAPP UNDERWOOD & PACHECO, P.L.C. 3200 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2250, Phoenix, Arizona 85012 Telephone: (602) 280-1000 Facsimile: (602) 265-1495 htaylor@rrulaw.com Aaron S. Ament, D.C. Bar #1602164 (pro hac vice forthcoming) Daniel A. Zibel, D.C. Bar #491377 (pro hac vice forthcoming) Maya H. Weinstein*, N.C. Bar #56621 (pro hac vice forthcoming) NATIONAL STUDENT LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK 1015 15th Street NW, Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 734-7495 aaron@defendstudents.org dan@defendstudents.org Brian Galle, N.Y. Bar #419154 (pro hac vice forthcoming) Georgetown University Law Center 600 New Jersey Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 662-4039 brian.galle@georgetown.edu Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-Defendant Student Defense *Admitted to practice law only in North Carolina; Supervised by organizational principals while D.C. Bar application is pending.	
10 11		
121314		
15	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA	
16	Grand Canyon University,	No.: 2:21-cv-00177
17	Plaintiff,	
18	v.	
19	Miguel Cardona, in his Official Capacity	MOTION OF NATIONAL
2021	as Secretary of the United States Department of Education, and the United States Department of Education.	STUDENT LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT
22	Defendants,	MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
23	and	MOTION TO INTERVENE
24	National Student Legal Defense Network,	
25	Applicant to Intervene.	April 22, 2021

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS
2	TABLE OF AUTHORITIESiii
3	MOTION TO INTERVENE
4	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES1
5	INTRODUCTION1
6	BACKGROUND5
7	I. For-Profit and Nonprofit Institutions under the Higher Education Act5
8	II. The GCU-GCE Transaction6
10	III. The Department's November 2019 Decision
11	IV. Proposed Intervenors9
12	LEGAL STANDARD10
13	ARGUMENT11
14	I. Student Defense Satisfies the Three Threshold Requirements for Permissive Intervention
15	A. Student Defense has an Independent Ground for Jurisdiction11
16 17	B. The Motion to Intervene is Timely 12
18	C. Students Defense's Defenses Share Common Questions of Law and Fact with the Main Action 12
19	II. The Court Should Use Its Discretion to Permit Student
20	Defense to Intervene
21	CONCLUSION17
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	CASES
3	Am. Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal. v. Burwell, No. 16-CV-03539-LB, 2017 WL 492833 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2017)
5	Arizonans for Fair Elections v. Hobbs, 335 F.R.D. 261 (D. Ariz. 2020)
6	Beckman Indus. V. Inst'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1992)
7	Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., 712 F.3d 1349 (9th Cir. 2013)
8	Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass'n, 647 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2011)
10	Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, No. CV-18-00047, 2018 WL 3497081 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2018) 10, 12, 13
11	Digit. Media Sols. V. South University, 1:19-CV-00145 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 2019).
12 13	Dunagan et al. v. Ill. Inst. of Art, et. al, No. 19-CV-00809 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2021)
14	Freedom from Religion Found. v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2011) 11
15	Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996)
16	Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2009) 13
17	Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016)
18	Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1977) 16
19	Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001)14, 16
20	STATUTES
21	HEA § 101, 20 U.S.C. § 1001
22	HEA § 102, 20 U.S.C. § 1002
23	20 U.S.C. § 1094
24	HEA § 498, 20 U.S.C. § 1099
25	20 U.S.C. § 3403(b)

Case 2:21-cv-00177-SRB Document 19 Filed 04/22/21 Page 4 of 23

1	
2	26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)
3	Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182
4	Pub. L. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4
5	RULES
6	Fed. R. Civ. P. 24passim
7	TREATISES
8	7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, <i>Fed. Practice & Proc.</i> § 1917 (3d ed. 2010)
9	REGULATIONS
10	34 C.F.R. § 600.2
11	34 C.F.R. § 600.31
12	34 C.F.R. §§ 600.4–600.5
13	34 C.F.R. § 668.28
14	OTHER AUTHORITIES
15	Grand Canyon Education, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20,
16	2019), available at: <a 4242733-grand-canyon-education-inc-lope-ceo-brian-mueller-on-q4-2018-"="" article="" href="https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001434588/000155837020001013/lope-edgar/data/0001434588/000145889/000145889/0001459/00014589/0001459/00014589/00001459/0001459/0001459/0001459/0001459/0001459/0001459/000145</td></tr><tr><td>17</td><td><u>20191231x10ka0a80b.htm</u></td></tr><tr><td>18</td><td>Grand Canyon Education Inc (LOPE) CEO Brain Mueller on Q4 2018 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, Seeking Alpha (Feb. 20, 2019,</td></tr><tr><td>19</td><td>10:55 PM), available at: https://seekingalpha.com/article/4242733-grand-canyon-education-inc-lope-ceo-brian-mueller-on-q4-2018-
20	results-earnings-call-transcript
21	Henry Hansmann, <i>The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise</i> , 89 Yale L.J. 835 (1980)
22	Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF) II Public and Private Nonprofit
23	Institution (a)(1) Programs (CFDA 84.425E and 84.425F) Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Mar. 19, 2021), available at:
24	https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/updateda1faqsheerfii.pdf

Case 2:21-cv-00177-SRB Document 19 Filed 04/22/21 Page 5 of 23

1	Nonprofit Conversions and Student Success: Recommendations for
2	Accreditors," Student Defense, available at:
2	https://www.defendstudents.org/news/body/quality-assurance/Student-
3	Defense-Quality-Assurance-Initiative-Nonprofit-Conversions.pdf9
	Paul Fain, Education Department Explains Grand Canyon Decision, Inside
4	Higher Ed (Nov. 13, 2019), available at:
5	https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/11/13/education-
5	department-explains-grand-canyon-decision
6	Restatement of Charitable Nonprofits § 1.01 cmt. (Am. Law Inst.
_	forthcoming 2021)5
7	National Student I and Defense Network Comment Letter on the
8	National Student Legal Defense Network, Comment Letter on the Oversight of For-Profit Institutions Converting to, or Attempting to
	Convert to, Non-Profit Entities (May 9, 2018), available at:
9	https://www.defendstudents.org/comment-
10	<u>letter-20180509.pdf</u>
10	Vivien Lee & Adam Looney, Brookings Institution, Understanding the
11	90/10 Rule: How reliant are public, private, and for-profit institutions
12	on federal aid? (Jan. 2019), available at: https://www.brookings.edu/
12	wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ES 20190116 Looney-90-10.pdf
13	
14	
L '1	
15	
16	
10	
17	
18	
10	
19	
,,	
20	
21	
,	
22	
23	
24	
25	

2

3 4

5

6 7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

25

24

MOTION TO INTERVENE

Defendant-Intervenor, the National Student Legal Defense Network ("Student Defense") respectfully moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) for an order permitting it to intervene as a defendant in this action ("Main Action"), in which Plaintiff Grand Canyon University ("GCU") challenges the decision of Defendants United States Department of Education and Secretary of Education Miguel Cardona, in his official capacity, (collectively, the "Department" or "Defendants") to deny its application for change in ownership from for-profit to nonprofit status. This motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and proposed Answer in Intervention (attached hereto as Exhibit A). Undersigned counsel reached out to counsel for the parties to obtain consent to intervention. GCU does not consent, and the Department stated that it does not take a position at this time.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES INTRODUCTION

Under the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("HEA"), the Department must determine whether institutions of higher education can participate in the Federal Student Aid programs authorized by Title IV of that Act, and thus serve as conduits for students to receive federal student loans and grants. In this regard, the HEA requires the Department to assess certain facts relating to an institution when determining whether the institution can participate. Two of those factors are relevant here.

First, when "qualifying" an institution to participate in the Title IV programs, the Department must consider the institution's ownership. HEA § 498, 20 U.S.C. § 1099c. Because the Department is required to consider ownership, and factors relating to both ownership and corporate control, a participating college must obtain approval from the Department when undergoing a "change in ownership that results in a change in control."

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	

See generally 34 C.F.R. § 600.31. Second, at all times, the Department must determine whether an institution qualifies as a "public," "proprietary," (i.e., for-profit) or "other nonprofit" institution as those terms are defined in the Department's regulations. See HEA §§ 101–102, 20 U.S.C. § 1001–1002; see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 600.4–600.5. Therefore, when an institution undergoes a "change in ownership resulting in a change in control," the Department must reconsider the institution's status as a public, proprietary, or nonprofit institution. 34 C.F.R. § 600.31.

This case involves an institution that sought to undergo a change in ownership that it believed would change its status with the Department from that of a proprietary institution to that of a nonprofit institution. *See generally* Compl. ¶¶ 1–3. In 2018, GCU submitted an application to the Department under which the institution would no longer be owned by the for-profit Grand Canyon Education, Inc. ("GCE"). *Id.* ¶ 61. Instead, GCU proposed an arrangement to the Department where it would purchase real property, tangible assets, and intangible assets from GCE, and then obtain services from GCE in exchange for fees paid pursuant to a Master Services Agreement ("MSA"). *Id.* ¶¶ 39, 62.

On November 6, 2019, the Department wrote to Brian Mueller, President and CEO of GCE and GCU, and informed him that it approved the change in ownership from GCE to GCU (referred to in the letter as "Gazelle") and would allow GCU to continue participating in the Title IV programs. *Id.* Nevertheless, after applying its three-part test to determine whether GCU qualified as a nonprofit, *see* 34 C.F.R. § 600.2 (definition of "[n]onprofit institution"), the Department determined, *inter alia*, that "the primary purpose" of the transaction was "to drive shareholder value for GCE," and GCU therefore did not meet the definition of a nonprofit institution. Letter from Michael Frola, Dir.,

2425

22

23

President, Grand Canyon Univ. (Nov. 6. 2019) ("Frola Ltr.").

stream of revenue benefit the nonprofit itself." *Id.* ¶ 129.

Multi-Reg'l & Foreign Schs. Participation Div., U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Brian Mueller,

3 4

5

6 7

8

9

10

12

11

13

14 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

GCU attempted to convince the Department that its November 2019 decision was erroneous. See Compl. ¶¶ 98–101. Unable to do so, GCU and GCE entered into a new Master Services Agreement (the "Amended MSA"), which altered aspects of the original arrangement. Id. ¶¶ 102–05. But on January 12, 2021, the Department issued a second decision "again declining to recognize GCU as a nonprofit for Title IV purposes." *Id.* ¶ 128. The January 2021 decision affirmed that, even under the Amended MSA, "GCU will still not meet the requirement that both the primary activities of the organization and its

GCU filed this lawsuit on February 2, 2021. On the one hand, this is a dispute between a regulated entity and its regulator about corporate restructuring, tax laws, and the applicable regulations. But it is more than that because of the intended beneficiaries of the entire regulatory structure: students. Thousands of third party intended beneficiaries—namely the current and future students who enroll at GCU—are impacted by the transaction and whether the institution is beholden to GCE or is, more broadly, operating in the public interest as a *bona fide* nonprofit institution. But remarkably, neither the 2019 decision nor the 2021 reconsideration decision discuss or describe the impacts on students that flow from the proposed conversion.

For students, there are immediate consequences should the Department reverse course. Under the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act,

¹ This letter was linked in an Insider Higher Ed article. See Paul Fain, Education Department Explains Grand Canyon Decision, Inside Higher Ed (Nov. 13, 2019), available at: https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/11/13/educationdepartment-explains-grand-canyon-decision. A direct URL to the letter is: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6548148-Grand-Canyon-University-Decision-on-CIO-11-06-19.html

2021 ("CRRSAA") (Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182) and the American Rescue Plan ("ARP") (Pub. L. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4), Congress provided substantial COVID-19 relief funds to institutions of higher education through the Higher Education Emergency Relief Funds ("HEERF"). But in so doing, Congress carved out a distinction for proprietary schools, which must use 100 percent of HEERF awards to provide emergency financial aid grants directly to students. Were GCU to be considered a nonprofit institution, it would be allowed to retain portions of those funds for institutional purposes, including, for example, covering lost revenue and reimbursement for expenses already incurred. See Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF) II Public and Private Nonprofit Institution (a)(1) Programs (CFDA 84.425E and 84.425F) Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Mar. 19, 2021), available at: https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/updatedalfagsheerfii.pdf. The current designation of GCU as a proprietary institution ensures that these federal funds solely 14 benefit students, rather than GCU shareholders. Under the Amended MSA terms, the for-profit, publicly traded GCE will take

roughly 59% of the revenues that GCU derives from student tuition, housing, and fees (which may or may not include federal COVID-19 relief funding), Compl. ¶ 104, but there is no party to this matter currently advocating for how that revenue will be used to serve students.² Despite this, GCU asserts that the Department of Education—which provided more than \$950 million in federal student loans and grants to Grand Canyon in 2019-20—is wrong to continue to treat the institution as anything other than a nonprofit institution. Students have a unique interest ensuring that GCU and GCE do not paper

23 24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

² Notably, Congress has placed certain limitations on the Department's authorities. For example, the Department is not authorized to "exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any educational institution[.]" 20 U.S.C. § 3403(b).

over their profit arrangements simply by rebranding GCU as a "nonprofit." For this and other reasons, explained more fully below, Student Defense seeks to intervene in this proceeding to ensure that the student voice is heard.

BACKGROUND

I. For-Profit and Nonprofit Institutions under the Higher Education Act

The HEA creates an important distinction between "public," "nonprofit," and "proprietary" institutions for purposes of participation in the Title IV student aid programs. But Congress did not define these terms. *See* HEA § 101–102, 20 U.S.C. § 1001–1002. The Department, however, has adopted definitions by regulation, which establish that a nonprofit institution is one that (1) is legally authorized to operate as a nonprofit in the states in which it is physically located; (2) is determined by the IRS to be an organization under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); and (3) "[i]s owned and operated by one or more nonprofit corporations or associations, no part of the net earnings of which benefits any private shareholder or individual[.]" 34 C.F.R. § 600.2 (definition of "[n]onprofit institution"); *see also* Frola Ltr. at 9–10; 34 C.F.R. § 600.5 (defining "proprietary institution" as an "institution of higher education" that is, *inter alia*, "not a public or private non-profit" institution).

In nonprofit law, the requirement that no part of the net earnings benefit any private shareholder or individual is referred to as the "nondistribution constraint" and generally is considered essential to the enhanced trust that stakeholders and regulators afford nonprofit organizations over organizations not so constrained. The nondistribution

³ See Restatement of Charitable Nonprofits § 1.01 cmt. (Am. Law Inst. forthcoming 2021).

⁴ See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, *The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise*, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 847 (1980) (explaining that "because of the legal constraints under which it must operate" a nonprofit warrants greater trust from donors and other consumers).

constraint is essential for diverse stakeholders to make an informed choice to trust a nonprofit organization to prioritize its *mission* over the financial interests of those who control the organization.⁵ Without the nondistribution constraint, those stakeholders have less assurance that the organization will pursue its mission rather than pursuing private financial interests.⁶

Congress recognized these divergent incentives when it set requirements specific to for-profit institutions. One of these statutory provisions, commonly referred to as the "90/10 Rule," requires for-profit schools to derive at least 10% of their revenues from sources other than federal student aid programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(24). The 90/10 Rule was intended to protect students at for-profit colleges by ensuring that "if an institution is providing a valuable education, someone other than the federal government should be willing to pay for students to attend." When a school converts from a for-profit to a nonprofit, it must report compliance with 90/10 for the first year following its conversion. Another requirement, for example, is that virtually all programs offered by for-profit institutions must "prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation," a requirement inapplicable to public or nonprofit degree programs. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1002(b)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1)(A).

II. The GCU-GCE Transaction

The transaction proposed by GCE and GCU would allow the two companies to hide behind a façade of nonprofit designation in order to avoid adhering to statutory

⁵ *Id.* at 844–45.

⁶ *Id.* at 873 (describing the nondistribution constraint as "the essential characteristic that permits nonprofit organizations to serve effectively as a response to contract failure").

⁷ Vivien Lee & Adam Looney, Brookings Institution, *Understanding the 90/10 Rule: How reliant are public, private, and for-profit institutions on federal aid?* (Jan. 2019), *available at:* https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ES 20190116 Looney-90-10.pdf.

2 3 4

protections enacted by Congress to protect for-profit college students. Under the proposed structure, the entities would continue functioning in a manner substantially similar to its current operations as a for-profit college, because GCE will provide services to GCU at a cost that far exceeds their value, using funds derived from student tuition, housing, and other fees. Frola Ltr., at 2–4.

According to the Department, the original MSA required GCU to pay GCE a fee equal to 60% of GCU's Adjusted Gross Revenue (which includes tuition and revenue generated from student housing, student meal plans, student activities, athletic and recreation revenue, and student use of online communication and learning services). *Id.* at 3. However, under the arrangement, GCE would only be responsible for 28% of GCU's operating costs. *Id.* at 3, 6. Under the MSA, if GCU were not to renew the agreement at end of the 15-year initial term or after each automatic 5-year renewal term, a massive non-renewal fee would be imposed on GCU. *Id.* at 3–4. GCU could only terminate the agreement if it first paid off the balance of the \$800 million loan from GCE that it took out to "purchase" the existing campus. *Id.* at 2–4.

In January 2020, GCU and GCE amended the MSA, capping the fee structure at 59% of GCU's total revenue, only marginally less than the original 60%. Compl. ¶ 102, 104. The Amended MSA also allowed GCU to invoke its right to terminate sooner and reduced the termination fee. *Id.* ¶ 105. The transaction was also problematic in that it was structured such that many members of the GCU Executive Leadership Team would remain employed by GCE. Significantly, Brian Mueller, CEO of GCE, would continue to serve as President of GCU. Letter from Martina Fernandez-Rosario, Dir., Sch. Eligibility & Oversight Serv. Grp., U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Brian Mueller, President, Grand Canyon Univ. (Jan. 12, 2021), at 17–19.

III. The Department's November 2019 Decision

The genesis of this litigation stems from the Department's application of the third prong of the definition of "nonprofit institution" in the regulations to deny nonprofit status to GCU: the requirement that no part of the net earnings benefit any private shareholder or individual. *See supra* pp. 5–6. The Department did not dispute that GCU is authorized to operate as a nonprofit in the states in which it is physically located (prong 1), nor did it take a position regarding the IRS's determination (prong 2). Rather, after applying the third prong of the definition the Department concluded that GCU was not a nonprofit. Accordingly, when the Department approved the change in ownership application, it approved GCU as a proprietary (for-profit) institution for the purposes of its continued participation in Title IV, HEA Programs. Frola Ltr., at 16-17.

In November 2019, the Department informed GCU that it would be subject to regulatory requirements of for-profit institutions such as compliance with "90/10 eligibility requirements described in 34 C.F.R. § 668.28 and any applicable gainful employment program requirements set out in 34 C.F.R. § Subpart Q." *Id.* at 17. The Department noted that GCU met two of three criteria that define a nonprofit under 34 C.F.R. § 600.2: (1) the IRS determined GCU to be a 501(c)(3) nonprofit and (2) GCU is legally authorized to operate as a nonprofit in the state that it was physically located. However, the Department determined that GCU did not meet the requirement that no part of the net earnings benefit any private shareholder or individual.

In reaching the determination that GCU failed to show that no part of the net earnings benefitted GCE and its shareholders, the Department found that the MSA requires GCU to pay significant portions of its revenue to GCE. Frola Ltr., at 14; *see also* Fernandez-Rosario Letter, at 3–4, The Department also raised concerns related to the nondistribution constraint, highlighting that GCU appears to be GCE's captive client.

Frola Ltr., at 14. The Department noted the non-renewal fees and the buy-out requirement to terminate the agreement. In addition to the financial constraints, the nonprofit GCU Board of Trustees would be governed by people who currently sit on the for-profit GCU board. *Id.* at 16. This structure makes it highly improbable, from a practical standpoint, that GCU could end its contractual relationship in the event that GCE fails to deliver student services or meet the demands of GCU. In spite of the Department's thorough technical analyses of the transaction, students—the intended beneficiaries of Title IV programs—are absent from its discussions.

IV. Proposed Intervenors

Student Defense is a nonprofit, non-partisan organization, recognized as tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code that works to advance students' rights to educational opportunity and to ensure that higher education provides a launching point for economic mobility. Declaration of Aaron Ament at ¶ 3–4 (attached hereto as Exhibit B). Student Defense has represented numerous students who have been harmed by the ramifications of attempted nonprofit conversions and changes in ownership of their institutions. Student Defense frequently represents students who are targeted by for-profit, often online institutions of higher education, including veterans, students of color, and those with financial hardships. Ament Decl. ¶ 4.

Student Defense has particular expertise in policies that are intended to protect students after a nonprofit conversion. In 2019, Student Defense published a report, "Nonprofit Conversions and Student Success," including recommendations for higher education accrediting agencies to protect students during conversions. In 2018, Student

⁸ See Dunagan et al. v. Ill. Inst. of Art, et al., No. 19-cv-00809 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2021); Digit. Media Sols. v. South University, 1:19-CV-00145 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 2019).

⁹ "Nonprofit Conversions and Student Success: Recommendations for

Defense submitted a detailed comment to the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity ("NACIQI"), a Federal Advisory Committee established by the HEA, in response to an invitation from NACIQI to provide analysis regarding increased oversight of institutions converting, or attempting to convert to, nonprofit status.¹⁰

LEGAL STANDARD

LEGAL

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B), the Court may permit intervention by any party who "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." Courts in the Ninth Circuit require parties to satisfy three threshold elements in order to permissively intervene: (1) an independent ground for jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common question of law and fact between the movant's claim or defense and the Main Action. *See, e.g., Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc.*, 712 F.3d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing *Beckman Indus. v. Int'l Ins. Co.*, 966 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992)). In addition, a motion to intervene must "be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). Student Defense is contemporaneously filling a proposed Answer (attached hereto as Exhibit A).

Once these requirements are satisfied, the Court may grant permissive intervention. *Id.* "In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties'

Accreditors," Student Defense, *available at:* https://www.defendstudents.org/news/body/quality-assurance/Student-Defense-Quality-Assurance-Initiative-Nonprofit-Conversions.pdf.

¹⁰ National Student Legal Defense Network, Comment Letter on the Oversight of For-Profit Institutions Converting to, or Attempting to Convert to, Non-Profit Entities (May 9, 2018), *available at*: https://www.defendstudents.org/comment-letter-20180509.pdf.

rights." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3); accord Blum, 712 F.3d at 1354. See also, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, No. CV-18-00047-TUC-JGZ, 2018 WL 3497081, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2018) (granting permissive intervention where there was "no suggestion" of prejudice).

ARGUMENT

Student Defense seeks to intervene at the start of this litigation because if GCU prevails in challenging the Department's decision, students are at substantial risk of harm. Student Defense does not raise any claims or questions of law not presented in the Main Action. Furthermore, Student Defense will align its position with the Department's reasoning under the HEA and APA for denying GCU's participation in Federal Student Aid programs as a nonprofit institution. For these reasons, intervention presents no jurisdictional concerns and poses no risk of delaying the Main Action or prejudicing the original parties to the case.

Importantly, Student Defense brings unique perspective and subject matter expertise to this case. Not only is Student Defense a voice for students, whose lives are most impacted by this action, but it is also staffed by individuals who are experts at the intersection of consumer protection and higher education, including individuals with high level government experience working on related issues. Accordingly, the Court should exercise its discretion to permit Student Defense to intervene as a defendant in this case.

I. Student Defense Satisfies the Three Threshold Requirements for Permissive Intervention

A. Student Defense has an Independent Ground for Jurisdiction

As a proposed defendant-intervenor in a federal question case, Student Defense need not show an independent ground for jurisdiction. *Freedom from Religion Found. v. Geithner*, 644 F.3d 836, 844 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[I]n federal-question cases, the identity of

the parties is irrelevant and the district court's jurisdiction is grounded in the federal question(s) raised by the plaintiff."). For this reason, the independent jurisdictional grounds requirement "does not apply to proposed intervenors in federal-question cases when the proposed intervenor is not raising new claims" or is a defendant. *Id.* (citing 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, *Fed. Practice & Proc.* § 1917 (3d ed. 2010) ("In federal-question cases there should be no problem of jurisdiction with regard to an intervening defendant)); see also Zinke, 2018 WL 3497081, at *4.

B. The Motion to Intervene is Timely

This Motion is undeniably timely. The Ninth Circuit has identified three factors relevant to determining whether a motion is timely: "(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of any delay." *Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 824 F.3d 919, 940 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (citation omitted). Moving "at an early stage of the proceedings," when "intervention would not cause disruption or delay in the proceedings," "are traditional features of a timely motion." *Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass'n*, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing *Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman*, 82 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 1996)); *see also Arizonans for Fair Elections v. Hobbs*, 335 F.R.D. 261, 265–66 (D. Ariz. 2020) (internal quotations omitted) (finding a motion timely when filed "at the outset of litigation" and before defendants filed an answer).

Student Defense is filing this motion at the beginning of the litigation, before Defendants file a responsive pleading. Granting this motion will cause neither delay nor prejudice to either party. *See, e.g., Glickman*, 82 F.3d at 837 (holding that a motion to intervene was timely where it was filed "before the [Defendant] had filed an answer, and before any proceedings had taken place").

C. Student Defense's Defenses Share Common Questions of Law and Fact with the Main Action

Finally, to qualify for permissive intervention, a potential intervenor need only show a "claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." *Hobbs*, 335 F.R.D. at 267 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B)). Student Defense intends to defend the Department's denial of GCU's conversion by raising common legal defenses to those on which the Department will likely rely, *i.e.*, that GCU is not a nonprofit under the regulatory definitions and that to qualify as such, GCU would need to make significant operational and management changes. Furthermore, the fundamental questions of law and fact will not change if Student Defense is permitted to intervene. This is sufficient to establish that Student Defense has defenses that share common questions of law or fact with the Main Action.

II. The Court Should Use Its Discretion and Permit Student Defense to Intervene

Because Student Defense satisfies the threshold factors, the Court has discretion to grant permissive intervention unless intervention would unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). The Court should exercise that discretion here.

First, as set forth above, this motion was filed shortly after GCU filed the Main Action, and the Department has not filed its Answer. This Court has not conducted or scheduled proceedings. Accordingly, granting Student Defense's motion would not delay the litigation. Moreover, Student Defense does not propose to assert a counterclaim or expand the questions of law or fact presented by the Complaint. There is, therefore, no prejudicial delay. See, e.g., Citizens for Balanced Use, 647 F.3d at 897 (finding no prejudice where intervention was granted "less than three months after the complaint was filed and less than two weeks after the [defendant] filed its answer to the complaint");

Zinke, 2018 WL 3497081, at *4 (finding no prejudice where intervenor's motion was timely filed and did not propose to bring new questions of law or fact into the dispute).

Second, intervention is particularly appropriate where the intervenors' interests may not be adequately represented by other parties. Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977)); Citizens for Balanced Use, 647 F.3d at 898–900 (reversing denial of intervention where, despite sharing an ultimate objective, the original defendant might not adequately represent the applicant's interests). This factor is satisfied where, as here, the Department and Student Defense share an ultimate objective but have different interests. Sw. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 823 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Just as the City could not successfully negotiate the Plans without some private sector participation from Applicants, so too the City in this case cannot be expected successfully to safeguard Applicants' legally protectable interests.").

There is no question that the interests of students and the Department are not the same. Whereas both the 2019 decision and 2021 reconsideration decision are premised on issues of technical noncompliance with a complicated regulatory regime, Student Defense is focused primarily on the real-world impacts on students that may result if GCU modifies the transaction to appease issues of technical noncompliance. For instance, whereas Department has analyzed numerous "valuation" reports, a "transfer pricing planning report," a "transfer pricing study," and an "economic profit split" analysis, the primary focus of Student Defense is the impact that the transaction would have on students. *See, e.g.* Fernandez-Rosario Ltr. at 4–9. If GCU is permitted to convert to a nonprofit while effectively remaining a for-profit institution, the majority of revenues from tuition and fees that students pay the school (*i.e.*, 59% under the Amended MSA)

will go to benefit GCE and its shareholders, rather than to directly benefit the educational institution and its students.

GCU—but presumably not the Department—is similarly focused on these real-world consequences, albeit from the opposite perspective. For instance, GCE reported to investors that "ED's determination to treat GCU as a proprietary institution for Title IV, HEA purposes could adversely impact GCU's enrollment." Grand Canyon Education, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2019) at 24, available at:

https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001434588/000155837020001013/lope-20191231x10ka0a80b.htm. GCE also stated that any limitations on GCU's ability to "identify itself as a nonprofit university in its advertising or other materials" could "have a material adverse effect on its enrollment and, consequently, on [GCU's] and [GCE's] financial condition, results of operations and cash flows." *Id*. 11

For students, the consequences of the proposed conversion are even more tangible. As part of recent COVID-19 relief packages, Congress placed restrictions on how for-profit colleges spend pandemic-related grant funds. These restrictions have significant implications for students. As a for-profit, GCU received over \$18 million under the CRRSAA formula (governing the second COVID-19 relief package), all of which must be provided to students to cover cost of attendance or pandemic-related emergency costs such as healthcare, childcare, food and housing. If, however, GCU was permitted to

¹¹ Notably, after it began advertising as a nonprofit school, GCU hit a record high of new student enrollment. See Grand Canyon Education Inc (LOPE) CEO Brain Mueller on Q4 2018 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, Seeking Alpha (Feb. 20, 2019, 10:55 PM), available at: https://seekingalpha.com/article/4242733-grand-canyon-education-inc-lope-ceo-brian-mueller-on-q4-2018-results-earnings-call-transcript. GCE attributed this increase—and the concurrent revenue growth—specifically to GCU's nonprofit status, with CEO Mueller boasting that being a nonprofit "has provided a tailwind from a new student growth perspective" and that the numbers are "evidence that being out there now a million times a day saying, we're non-profit, has had an impact." Id.

participate as a non-profit, GCU will only be required to provide \$11.175 million in direct student aid to students.

In contrast, CRRSAA provides far more flexibility to nonprofit and public institutions. While nonprofit and public institutions are required to give at least the same amount in direct financial aid grants to students as they were required to provide under a formula adopted under the prior "CARES Act," governing an initial round of COVID-19 funding, institutions may use remaining grant funds for institutional needs, such as lost revenue. This distinction is critical, because whereas nonprofit institutions' primary stakeholders are their students, for-profit institutions have a fiduciary obligation to shareholders with financially motivated interests. If GCU were able to spend the stimulus funds under the provisions afforded to nonprofit institutions, there is a significant risk of large portions of these taxpayer funds flowing to GCE.

The implications for GCU students will continue under a new round of funding (HEERF III) that was included in Section 2003 of the ARP, signed into law on March 11, 2021. While allocations have not yet been determined, the spending requirements are similar to those established under the CRRSAA: for-profit institutions must spend all funding on student aid grants while nonprofit and public institutions are only required to spend only half on student aid, with remaining funds going to the institution itself. Yet again, if considered a nonprofit under this formula, students would be at risk of GCU spending emergency grants to prioritize GCE shareholders, not students.

Third, intervention is appropriate where the proposed intervenor "would likely offer important elements to the proceedings that the existing parties would likely neglect." Berg, 268 F.3d at 823; see also Spangler, 552 F.2d at 1329 (asserting that a court should consider "whether parties seeking intervention will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit, and . . . the legal questions

presented"); Am. Civil Liberties Union	of N. Cal. v. Burwell, No. 16-CV-03539-LB, 2017	
WL 492833, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2017) (granting United States Conference of		
Catholic Bishop's motion to intervene i	in Establishment Clause challenge where	
intervention would "contribute to the de	evelopment of the factual and legal landscape").	
As described above, the Department ha	s focused exclusively in its letters on technical	
legal compliance, without significant co	onsideration to the implications that this case will	
have on students. Without Student Defense's intervention, the impact on students may		
not be addressed.		
If GCU is granted nonprofit state	us without adequate student protections, the risks	
for students are high. Student Defense i	is uniquely positioned to advocate on behalf of	
students and provide the court with a no	ecessary perspective on how the legal issues	
presented impact students.		
CC	ONCLUSION	
Defendant-Intervenor Student D	refense respectfully requests that the Court grant	
its motion for permissive intervention.	Student Defense meets all of the requirements of	
permissive intervention under Federal I	Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1)(B) and its	
participation will materially assist the resolution of issues in this case.		
	Respectfully submitted,	
	/s/ J. Henk Taylor J. Henk Taylor, A.Z. Bar #016321 RYAN RAPP UNDERWOOD & PACHECO, P.L.C. 3200 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2250 Phoenix, Arizona 85012 Telephone: (602) 280-1000 Facsimile: (602) 265-1495 htaylor@rrulaw.com	
	Aaron S. Ament, D.C. Bar #1602164 (pro hac vice forthcoming)	

Case 2:21-cv-00177-SRB Document 19 Filed 04/22/21 Page 23 of 23

1	Daniel A. Zibel, D.C. Bar #491377
2	(pro hac vice forthcoming) Maya H. Weinstein*, N.C. Bar #56621
	(pro hac vice forthcoming)
3	NATIONAL STUDENT LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK
4	1015 15th Street NW, Suite 600
5	Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 734-7495
	aaron@defendstudents.org
6	dan@defendstudents.org
7	maya@defendstudents.org
8	Brian Galle, N.Y. Bar #419154
	(pro hac vice forthcoming) Georgetown University Law Center
9	600 New Jersey Avenue NW
10	Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 662-4039
11	brian.galle@georgetown.edu
	Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-
12	Defendant Student Defense
13	* Admitted to practice law only in North
14	Carolina; Supervised by organizational
	principals while D.C. Bar application is pending.
15	April 22, 2021
16	April 22, 2021
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

EXHIBIT A

1 2 3 4	J. Henk Taylor, A.Z. Bar #016321 RYAN RAPP UNDERWOOD & PACHECO 3200 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2250, Phoenix Telephone: (602) 280-1000 Fascimile: (602) 265-1495 htaylor@rrulaw.com	
5 6 7 8 9 110 111 112 113	Aaron S. Ament, D.C. Bar #1602164 (pro har Daniel A. Zibel, D.C. Bar #491377 (pro har Maya H. Weinstein*, N.C. Bar #56621 (pro har NATIONAL STUDENT LEGAL DEFENSE 1015 15th Street NW, Suite 600, Washington (202) 734-7495 aaron@defendstudents.org dan@defendstudents.org maya@defendstudents.org Brian Galle, N.Y. Bar #419154 (pro hac vice Georgetown University Law Center 600 New Jersey Avenue NW, Washington, D (202) 662-4039 brian.galle@georgetown.edu	vice forthcoming) hac vice forthcoming) NETWORK h, D.C. 20005
14 15 16	Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-Defendant * Admitted to practice law only in North Carprincipals while D.C. Bar application is pend	olina; Supervised by organizational
17	IN THE UNITED STAT FOR THE DISTRI	
18	Grand Canyon University,	No.: 2:21-cv-00177
19	Plaintiff,	
20 21	v.	
22	Miguel Cardona, in his Official Capacity as	
23	Secretary of the United States Department of Education, and the United States	
24	Department of Education. Defendants,	
25	and	
26	National Student Legal Defense Network,	
27	_	
28	Applicant to Intervene.	

INTERVENOR-DEFENDANT'S ANSWER

Defendant-Intervenor National Student Legal Defense Network, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby states as follows as an Answer to the Complaint of Plaintiff Grand Canyon University in the above-captioned action.

- 1. Intervenor-Defendant admits that GCU is a private Christian university in Phoenix, Arizona, and that from its inception in 1949 until 2004, GCU operated as an Arizona nonprofit institution. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 2. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 3. Intervenor-Defendant admits that "new GCU" was recently formed. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 4. Intervenor-Defendant admits that the IRS and GCU's accreditor approved GCU's nonprofit status. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 5. Intervenor-Defendant admits that the Department has denied GCU's application to be considered a nonprofit institution of higher education, as that term is used with reference to Title IV of the Higher Education Act ("HEA) and its regulations. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
 - 6. Deny.

9

10

11

12 13

14 15

16

17

18 19

20 21

22

23

24

25

Aspects of this Paragraph constitute legal conclusions to which no response 7. is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.

INTRODUCTION¹

- 8. The first sentence of this Paragraph contains Plaintiffs' own characterization of their motives for this lawsuit, as to which Intervenor-Defendant lacks knowledge. Intervenor-Defendant admits that at the time of the Department's denial, the IRS had approved GCU as a tax-exempt nonprofit pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 9. The first sentence contains a characterization of the Department's written statement, as to which the best evidence of the Department's basis is the written statement itself. Because the remainder of the paragraph is premised on vague allegations of what is "materially similar," Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations.
 - 10. Admit.
- Intervenor-Defendant admits the first two sentences of the Paragraph. With 11. respect to the third sentence, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the Department stated in its November 6, 2019, letter that it "does not take a position with respect to Gazelle's non-profit 501(c)(3) status with the Internal Revenue Service. However, GCU must cease any advertising or notices that refer to its 'nonprofit status.'...The Department does not take a position regarding statements that GCU may make about its IRS status as a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization." Intervenor-Defendant further admits that the

Student Defense has included the headings listed in the Complaint only to assist in reading the pleadings. Student Defense does not admit, and in fact denies, the accuracy of those headings to the extent that they can be construed as asserting allegations of fact.

Department reinforced the position stated in the previous sentence in its January 12, 2021 letter. The final two sentences of this Paragraph constitute legal conclusions to which no response is required.

- 12. This allegation, including its subparts, contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations.
- 13. This allegation makes and characterizes a legal conclusion, so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations.
- 14. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 15. Intervenor-Defendant admits that Paragraph 15 describes Plaintiff's claims and denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief on its claims.

PARTIES

- 16. Intervenor-Defendant admits that GCU is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation in the State of Arizona, with its principal place of business at 3300 West Camelback Road Phoenix, AZ 85017. Intervenor-Defendant further admits that GCU has been recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Except as so stated, the allegations are denied.
- 17. Intervenor-Defendant admits that Miguel Cardona is the Secretary of the Department and has been sued in his official capacity. Intervenor-Defendant further admits that the official address of the Department and Secretary Cardona is 400 Maryland Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20202. Except as so stated, the allegations are denied.
 - 18. Admit.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3

4

2

19.

5 6

7

8 9

10 11

12

13 14

15 16

17

18 19

20 21

22

23

24

25

legal conclusions and questions of law to be determined solely by the Court, to which no answer is required.

This paragraph sets forth Plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations that present

- 20. This paragraph sets forth Plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations that present legal conclusions and questions of law to be determined solely by the Court, to which no answer is required.
- 21. This paragraph sets forth Plaintiff's venue allegations that present legal conclusions and questions of law to be determined solely by the Court, to which no answer is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the proper venue is determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Background

- 22. Intervenor-Defendant admits that GCU is a private Christian university located in Phoenix, Arizona. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 23. Intervenor-Defendant admits that GCU was founded in 1949. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and 24. therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 25. Intervenor-Defendant denies that GCU "be[came] a publicly traded institution in 2008." Intervenor-Defendant admits that GCE became a publicly-traded entity in 2008. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.

- 26. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 27. Intervenor-Defendant admits that GCE was a publicly traded company. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 28. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 29. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 30. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 31. Intervenor-Defendant admits that Plaintiff entered into a partnership with the City of Phoenix Police Department. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the remaining allegations in this Paragraph.
- 32. Intervenor-Defendant admits that Plaintiff partnered with Habitat for Humanity. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the remaining allegations in this Paragraph.
- 33. Intervenor-Defendant admits that Plaintiff established centers called Learning Lounges® in the community that offer free in-person and online tutoring and mentoring to English and Spanish speaking K–12 students in the Phoenix area. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the remaining allegations in this Paragraph.
- 34. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.

35. Intervenor-Defendant admits that Plaintiff opened a regional point-of-1 dispensing site for the Pfizer coronavirus vaccine. Except as so stated, Intervenor-2 Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the 3 remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 4 5 36. 6 7 37. 8 9 38. 10 11 12 The Transaction 13 39. 14 15 16

B. GCU Converts Back to Nonprofit Status

- Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in the first two sentences of this Paragraph. Intervenor-Defendant denies the remaining allegations in this Paragraph.
- Intervenor-Defendant admits that GCU publicly announced its intent to convert to nonprofit status in 2014 and admits that GCU stated at that time that the remainder of the allegations in this Paragraph would be true. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks sufficient information to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 40. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 41. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this paragraph, including its subparts.
- 42. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.

25

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

- 43. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 44. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 45. Intervenor-Defendant admits that each of the named entities reviewed the transaction and recognized GCU as a nonprofit organization under their own respective standards. Except as so stated, the allegations in this Paragraph are denied.

GCU Follows IRS, HLC and Department Requirements in Obtaining Nonprofit Status

- 46. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this paragraph.
- 47. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 48. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph and its subparts.
- 49. Intervenor-Defendant admits that GCU's IRS determination letter was dated November 9, 2015, and that the IRS approved its 501(c)(3) nonprofit status at that time. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 50. Intervenor-Defendant admits that the transaction closed on July 1, 2018. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 51. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.

- 63. Insofar as this Paragraph including its subparts describes the content of the pre-acquisition review request, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that request is the request itself.
- 64. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 65. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 66. Intervenor-Defendant admits to the first sentence of this Paragraph. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in the final sentence of this Paragraph.
- 67. Intervenor-Defendant admits that HLC typically requires transactions to close within 30 days of approval. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the remaining allegations in this Paragraph.
- 68. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 69. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 70. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 71. This Paragraph states a legal conclusion as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits.
- 72. This Paragraph states a legal conclusion as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits.
 - 73. Deny.

best evidence of the contents of the letter is the letter itself. To the extent the allegations

state a legal conclusion regarding the Department's applications of its standards,

Intervenor-Defendant denies the remaining allegations in this Paragraph.

23

24

1	81.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
2	therefore denies, the allegations in the first two sentences of this Paragraph. Intervenor-		
3	Defendant admits that Plaintiff remains an independent, private university, accorded		
4	nonprofit status by the State of Arizona and tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of		
5	the Internal Revenue Code by the IRS.		
6	The Department's November 6, 2019 Decision Letter Is Arbitrary and		
7	Without Justification		
8	82.	Deny.	
9	83.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
10	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		
11	84.	Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation to the extent it characterizes the	
12	contents of an email, the best evidence of which is the email itself. Except as so stated,		
13	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies,		
14	the allegations in this Paragraph.		
15	85.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
16	therefore de	nies, the allegations in this Paragraph.	
17	86.	Admit.	
18	87.	Deny.	
19	88.	Deny.	
20	89.	Intervenor-Defendant admits that the IRS made a determination regarding	
21	GCU's status under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code. Except as so stated,		
22	Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.		
23	90.	Intervenor-Defendant admits that the IRS made a determination regarding	
24	GCU's statu	s under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code. Except as so stated,	

Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.

- 91. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the November 2019 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that letter is the letter itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 92. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the November 2019 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that letter is the letter itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph, including its subparts.
- 93. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the November 2019 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that letter is the letter itself. With respect to subparagraph (d), Intervenor-Defendant also admits that the Department approved GCU's Title IV participation as a for-profit, or proprietary institution. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph, including its subparts.
- 94. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the November 2019 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that letter is the letter itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 95. This allegation contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, and insofar as the allegation includes only a summary of 34 C.F.R. § 668.25, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 96. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the November 2019 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that letter

1	is the letter itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this		
2	Paragraph.		
3	97. Deny.		
4	GCU Proposes to Amend the MSA as an Alternative Solution to		
5	Litigating the November 6, 2019 Decision		
6	98. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and		
7	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		
8	99. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and		
9	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		
10	100. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and		
11	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		
12	101. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and		
13	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		
14	102. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and		
15	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		
16	103. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and		
17	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		
18	104. Intervenor-Defendant admits that the fee structure under the original MSA		
19	was capped at 60% payment required. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks		
20	information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this		
21	Paragraph.		
22	105. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and		
23	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		
24	106. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and		
25	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		

1	107. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
2	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
3	108. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
4	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
5	109. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
6	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
7	110. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
8	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
9	111. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
10	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
11	112. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
12	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
13	113. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
14	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
15	114. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
16	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
17	115. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
18	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
19	116. Deny.
20	117. Deny.
21	118. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
22	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
23	119. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
24	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph, including its subparts.
25	

- 131. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the January 12, 2021 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that letter is the letter itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 132. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 133. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 134. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the January 12, 2021 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that letter is the letter itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 135. This Paragraph contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Insofar as a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
 - 136. Deny.
- 137. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the January 12, 2021 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that letter is the letter itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 138. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 139. This allegation contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Insofar as a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.

- 140. This allegation contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Insofar as a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph, including its subparts.
- 141. This allegation contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Insofar as a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 142. This allegation contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Insofar as a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 143. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
 - 144. Deny.
- 145. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the January 12, 2021 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that letter is the letter itself. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 146. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 147. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of a written communication, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that communication is the communication itself.
- 148. The first two sentences of this Paragraph constitute legal conclusions to which no answer is required. With respect to the remainder of the allegations, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.

C. The Department Lacks Authority Under Its Regulations to Determine Nonprofit Status

The Department's Regulations About Nonprofit Conversions

- 149. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 150. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 151. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 152. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 153. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 154. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 155. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits the allegation in this Paragraph.

contents of what was "[i]mplicit" in a federal agency's statement to the United States

174.

25

Admit.

1	175.	Intervenor-Defendant denies that the allegations in Paragraph 175 reflect	
2	the context a	and full scope of the language in the proposed rules.	
3	176.	Intervenor-Defendant admits that Paragraph 176 describes the	
4	Department'	's support of the proposed rule, but denies the allegations to the extent that	
5	Plaintiff doe	es not contextualize the quotation and misconstrues its true meaning.	
6	177.	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
7	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation		
8	in this Paragraph.		
9	178.	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
10	required. To	the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
11	in this Parag	graph.	
12		The Department's Past Practice With Nonprofit Conversion	
13	179.	Deny.	
14	180.	Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of Congressional testimony,	
15	Intervenor-I	Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that testimony is the	
16	record of such testimony. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the		
17	allegations in this Paragraph.		
18	181.	Admit.	
19	182.	Deny.	
20	183.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
21	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.		
22	184.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
23	therefore de	nies, the allegations in this Paragraph.	
24	185.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
25	therefore de	nies, the allegations in this Paragraph.	

The Department's Departure From Its Longstanding Practice

- 186. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
 - 187. Admit.
- 188. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the Department's August 2016 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 189. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the Department's August 2016 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant admits the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 190. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the Department's August 2016 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 191. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the Department's August 2016 decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 192. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the Department's prior communication, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of that communication is a copy of the communication itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.

1	193.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
2	therefore de	nies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
3	194.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
4	therefore de	nies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
5	195.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
6	therefore de	nies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
7	196.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
8	therefore de	nies, the allegations in this Paragraph and its subparts.
9	197.	Intervenor-Defendant admits that through a notice published in the Federal
10	Register in J	uly 2019, the Department repealed the gainful employment rules. Except as
11	so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the remaining allegations in this Paragraph.	
12		The Department's Inconsistent Treatment of Similarly Situated
13		Institutions
13	198.	Institutions This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is
13 14 15		This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation
13 14 15 16	required. To	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation
13 14 15 16 17	required. To	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation raph.
13 14	required. To in this Parag 199.	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation raph. Deny.
113 114 115 116 117 118 118 118	required. To in this Parag 199. 200. status and ac	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation raph. Deny. Intervenor-Defendant admits that the Department denied GCU's nonprofit
113 114 115 116 117 118 119	required. To in this Parag 199. 200. status and ac	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation graph. Deny. Intervenor-Defendant admits that the Department denied GCU's nonprofit denits that it approved a transaction between Purdue University and Kaplan
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	required. To in this Parage 199. 200. status and act University. I	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation graph. Deny. Intervenor-Defendant admits that the Department denied GCU's nonprofit denits that it approved a transaction between Purdue University and Kaplan
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	required. To in this Parage 199. 200. status and act University. It Paragraph. 201.	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation raph. Deny. Intervenor-Defendant admits that the Department denied GCU's nonprofit dmits that it approved a transaction between Purdue University and Kaplan Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this

- 202. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the Department's decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of the decision is the decision itself.
- 203. Defendant-Intervenor admits that Purdue created a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, Purdue University Global, to purchase the credential-issuing side of Kaplan's higher education business. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
 - 204. Admit.
 - 205. Admit.
- 206. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the Department's decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of the decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 207. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the Department's decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of the decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant admits the allegations in this Paragraph.
 - 208. Admit.
- 209. Insofar as this Paragraph describes the content of the Department's decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the content of the decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant admits the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 210. Insofar as this Paragraph characterizes the contents of the MSA, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the contents of the MSA is the MSA itself.

- 211. Insofar as this Paragraph characterizes the contents of the MSA, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the contents of the MSA is the MSA itself.

 Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 212. Insofar as this Paragraph characterizes the contents of the Department's decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the contents of the decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 213. Insofar as this Paragraph characterizes the contents of the Department's decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the contents of the decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 214. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 215. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 216. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 217. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 218. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.

219. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.

The Department's End-Run Around Negotiated Rulemaking

- This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is 220. required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is 221. required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 222. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
 - D. Even Assuming the Department Has Authority to Determine Nonprofit Status for Title IV Purposes, the Decision is Arbitrary and Capricious **Under Its Own Reading, the Department Exceeded Its Authority**
- 223. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 224. Insofar as this Paragraph characterizes the contents of the Department's decision, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the best evidence of the contents of the decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.

- 233. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 234. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 235. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the quotation from *United States v. Dykema* is accurately transcribed, but does not describe the Department's obligations under the law.
- 236. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 237. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 238. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 239. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 240. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 241. Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations as to the January 12, 2021 Decision. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations pertaining to the August 20, 2020 letter.
- 242. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.

1	255.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
2	therefore denies, the allegations in the first sentence of this Paragraph. Intervenor-	
3	Defendant denies the allegation in the second sentence in this Paragraph.	
4	256.	Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and
5	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.	
6	257.	Deny.
7	258.	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is
8	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
9	in this Paragraph.	
10	259.	Deny.
11	260.	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is
12	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
13	in this Paragraph.	
14	261.	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is
15	required. To	the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation
16	in this Paragraph.	
17		GCU's Net Earnings Do Not Improperly Benefit GCE
18	262.	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is
19	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
20	in this Paragraph.	
21	263.	Admit.
22	264.	This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is
23	required. To	the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation
24	in this Parag	raph.
25		

- 265. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 266. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 267. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 268. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 269. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant avers that the best evidence of the contents of the Department's decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 270. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant avers that the best evidence of the contents of the Department's decision is the decision itself. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 271. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 272. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.

1	273. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no respons	e is
2	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
3	in this Paragraph.	
4	Brian Mueller's Dual Role Is Irrelevant to GCU's Nonprofit Status	
5	274. Admit.	
6	275. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no respons	se is
7	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
8	in this Paragraph.	
9	276. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no respons	se is
10	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
11	in this Paragraph.	
12	277. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no respons	e is
13	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the	allegation
14	in this Paragraph.	
15	278. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no respons	e is
16	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
17	in this Paragraph.	
18	279. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no respons	e is
19	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
20	in this Paragraph.	
21	280. Admit.	
22	281. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or der	ıy, and
23	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.	
24		

290.

24

25

Deny.

1	291. Intervenor-Defendant admits that in its November 6, 2019, and January	12,
2	2021, letters the Department stated that it "does not take a position with respect to	
3	Gazelle's non-profit 501(c)(3) status with the Internal Revenue Service." Except as so)
4	stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.	
5	292. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
6	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.	
7	293. Admit.	
8	294. Admit.	
9	295. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
10	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.	
11	296. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
12	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.	
13	297. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
14	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegat	ion
15	in this Paragraph.	
16	298. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
17	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegat	ion
18	in this Paragraph.	
19	299. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and	
20	therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.	
21	300. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
22	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegat	ion
23	in this Paragraph.	
24	301. Deny.	
25	302. Deny.	

The MSA Does Not Allow GCE to Operate GCU 1 303. The first sentence allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no 2 response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies 3 the allegation in this Paragraph. Intervenor-Defendant admits the second sentence of the 4 Paragraph. 5 304. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is 6 required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits the allegation 7 in this Paragraph. 8 305. Intervenor-Defendant admits that the quoted language is included in 34 9 C.F.R. § 668.25(a). Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this 10 Paragraph. 11 306. Deny. 12 307. Deny. 13 This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is 308. 14 required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation 15 in this Paragraph. 16 309. Deny. 17 Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and 310. 18 therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph. 19 311. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and 20 therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph. 21 Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and 312. 22 therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph. 23

Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and

313.

therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.

24

6

9 10

8

11

12

13 14

15

16 17

18 19

21

20

22

23 24

25

- 314. Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is 315. required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- Intervenor-Defendant lacks information sufficient to admit or deny, and 316. therefore denies, the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 317. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
 - 318. Admit.
- Intervenor-Defendant admits that in its November 6, 2019 letter the 319. Department stated that it "does not take a position with respect to Gazelle's non-profit 501(c)(3) status with the Internal Revenue Service" and in its January 12, 2021 letter the Department stated that "the fact that HLC may have reached a different conclusion is neither binding nor persuasive." Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.

E. The Department's Licensing Regime Is an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint

Intervenor-Defendant admits that Plaintiff was previously approved to 321. operate as a nonprofit business by the State of Arizona and the IRS. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the remaining allegations in this Paragraph.

1	322. Deny.	
2	323. Deny.	
3	324. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
4	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
5	in this Paragraph.	
6	325. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
7	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
8	in this Paragraph.	
9	326. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
10	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
11	in this Paragraph.	
12	327. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
13	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
14	in this Paragraph.	
15	328. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
16	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation	
17	in this Paragraph.	
18	COUNT I	
19	329. Intervenor-Defendant correspondingly incorporates the preceding	
20	paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.	
21	330. Deny.	
22	331. Deny.	
23	332. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is	
24	required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies that the	
25	Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously.	

- 333. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this paragraph.
- 334. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief on its claims.
- 335. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief on its claims.

COUNT II

- 336. Intervenor-Defendant correspondingly incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
- 337. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits that the APA prohibits agency action that is contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious. Intervenor-Defendant denies the remaining allegations in this Paragraph.
- 338. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies that the Department's Decisions were contrary to law.
- 339. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies that the Department's Decisions were arbitrary and capricious. Intervenor-Defendant further denies each of the separately numbered subparts.
- 340. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies that the

Department violated "notices of notions, due process, and equal protection." Intervenor-Defendant further denies that the Department acted contrary to law.

341. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief on its claims.

COUNT III

- 342. Intervenor-Defendant correspondingly incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
- 343. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits that HEA § 492 sets forth the Department's obligations to promulgate rules through negotiated rulemaking. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 344. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant admits that 5 U.S.C. § 553 sets forth certain requirements that agencies must follow. Except as so stated, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegation in this Paragraph.
- 345. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 346. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.

COUNT IV

- 347. Intervenor-Defendant correspondingly incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
- 348. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 349. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 350. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 351. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 352. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 353. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.
- 354. This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.

4

6

7

5

8 9

11 12

10

13

14

15

17

16

18 19

20

21 22

23

25

24

This allegation constitutes a legal conclusion to which no response is 355. required. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor-Defendant denies the allegations in this Paragraph.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

In response to the paragraph in the prayer for relief in the Plaintiff's Complaint, Intervenor-Defendant responds as follows:

- Defendant-Intervenor denies that Plaintiff is entitled to an order and 1. judgment under the First Cause of Action declaring that GCU is a nonprofit institution for purpose of Title IV programs and denies that Plaintiff is entitled to be regulated as a nonprofit institution of higher education.
- 2. Defendant-Intervenor denies that Plaintiff is entitled to an order and judgment under the Second Cause of Action declaring that the Department's Decisions are not in accordance with law and are arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706. Intervenor-Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to have the Department's Decisions vacated. Intervenor-Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to the Department to be ordered to hold that GCU is a nonprofit educational institution for all purposes.
- Defendant-Intervenor denies that Plaintiff is entitled to an order and 3. judgment vacating the Department's Decisions under the Third Cause of Action.
- 4. Defendant-Intervenor denies that Plaintiff is entitled under the Fourth Cause of Action to an order and judgment declaring that the Department's Decisions deny GCU's constitutionally protected right to call itself a nonprofit institution in violation of the First Amendment.
- 5. Defendant-Intervenor denies that Plaintiff is entitled to an order vacating the for-profit PPA the Department required GCU to sign in order to participate in Title IV

1	programs and denies that Plaintiff is entitled to an order requiring the Department to issue			
2	GCU a new PPA recognizing GCU as a nonprofit institution of higher education.			
3	6. Defendant-Intervenor denies that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees and			
4	costs.			
5	7.	Defendant-Intervenor denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief.		
6	8.	Defendant-Intervenor denies any and all allegations not specifically		
7	admitted herein.			
8	GENERAL DENIAL			
9	Defendant-Intervenor denies any and all allegations not specifically admitted herein.			
10		DATED this 22nd day of April, 2021		
11		Respectfully submitted,		
12		/s/ J. Henk Taylor		
13		J. Henk Taylor, A.Z. Bar #016321		
14		RYAN RAPP UNDERWOOD & PACHECO, P.L.C.		
15		3200 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2250 Phoenix, Arizona 85012		
16		Telephone: (602) 280-1000 Fascimile: (602) 265-1495		
17		htaylor@rrulaw.com		
18		Aaron S. Ament, D.C. Bar #1602164 (pro hac vice forthcoming)		
19		Daniel A. Zibel, D.C. Bar #491377 (pro hac vice forthcoming)		
20		Maya H. Weinstein*, N.C. Bar #56621 (pro hac vice forthcoming)		
21		ŇATIONAL STUDENT LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK		
22		1015 15th Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20005		
23		(202) 734-7495 aaron@defendstudents.org		
24		dan@defendstudents.org maya@defendstudents.org		
25		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		

Case 2:21-cv-00177-SRB Document 19-1 Filed 04/22/21 Page 45 of 45

Brian Galle, N.Y. Bar #419154 (pro hac vice forthcoming) Georgetown University Law Center 600 New Jersey Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 662-4039 brian.galle@georgetown.edu Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-Defendant Student Defense * Admitted to practice law only in North Carolina; Supervised by organizational principals while D.C. Bar application is pending.

EXHIBIT B

Case 2:21-cv-00177-SRB Document 19-2 Filed 04/22/21 Page 2 of 4

- 1			
1	J. Henk Taylor, A.Z. Bar #016321		
2	RYAN RAPP UNDERWOOD & PACHECO, P.L.C. 3200 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2250, Phoenix, Arizona 85012		
3	Telephone: (602) 280-1000 htaylor@rrulaw.com		
3			
4	Aaron S. Ament, D.C. Bar #1602164 (pro had Daniel A. Zibel, D.C. Bar #491377 (pro hac to		
5	Maya H. Weinstein*, N.C. Bar #56621 (pro h NATIONAL STUDENT LEGAL DEFENSE	hac vice forthcoming)	
6	1015 15th Street NW, Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 734-7495		
7	aaron@defendstudents.org dan@defendstudents.org		
8	maya@defendstudents.org		
9	Brian Galle, N.Y. Bar #419154 (pro hac vice Georgetown University Law Center	forthcoming)	
0	600 New Jersey Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 662-4039		
1	brian.galle@georgetown.edu		
2	* Admitted to practice law only in North Carolina; Supervised by organizational principals while D.C. Bar application is pending.		
3	Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-Defendant	t Student Defense	
4	IN THE UNITED STAT	ES DISTRICT COURT	
5	FOR THE DISTRI	CT OF ARIZONA	
6	Grand Canyon University,		
7	Plaintiff,		
8			
9		No.: 2:21-cv-00177	
0	Miguel Cardona, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Education, and the United States		
1	Department of Education.		
2	Defendants,		
3	and		
4	National Student Legal Defense Network,		
5	Applicant to Intervene.		

DECLARATION OF AARON AMENT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS A DEFENDANT

-

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Aaron Ament, declare:

4

 I have served as President of the National Student Legal Defense Network ("Student Defense") since its creation in 2017. I am over 18 years of age and have

6

personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.

7

founded in 2017 by former U.S. Department of Education officials with significant

Student Defense is a non-partisan, non-profit 501(c)(3) organization

9

8

expertise in federal higher education policies, regulations, and other issues that impact

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

students.

3. Student Defense's mission and objectives are to engage in litigation and

advocacy work to advance students' rights to educational opportunity and to ensure that

higher education provides a launching point for economic mobility. Student Defense

frequently represents students who attend for-profit, often online institutions of higher

education, such as veterans, students of color, and those with financial hardships.

4. Student Defense represents students who are misled by for-profit college

marketing and recruitment practices and has represented numerous students who have

been harmed by the ramifications of attempted non-profit conversions and changes in

ownership of their institutions of higher education. For example, Student Defense

represents students seeking damages after being misled and harmed by the Illinois

Institute of Art; its parent companies, Dream Center Education Holdings, Inc. and the

Dream Center Foundation; and its executives, in Dunagan et al. v. Illinois Institute of Art,

23 LLC, et al., No. 19-cv-0809 (N.D. Ill.) and in Digital Media Solutions v. South

24 University, 1:19-CV-00145 (N.D. Ohio).

5. In 2018, Student Defense also submitted an extensive comment for the record to the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity on the need for increased oversight of for-profit institutions converting to nonprofit entities.

For all of the reasons stated above, Student Defense requests permission to intervene in this case as a defendant.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXECUTED this 22nd day of April, 2021, in Silver Spring, Maryland.

Aaron Ament

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 9 Grand Canyon University, 10 11 Plaintiff, 12 V. 13 Miguel Cardona, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the United States Department 14 of Education, and The United States 15 Department of Education. Case No.: 2:21-cv-00177 16 Defendants. 17 and 18 National Student Legal Defense Network, 19 Applicant to Intervene. 20 21 22 <u>ORDER</u> 23 Upon consideration of the motion filed by the National Student Legal Defense 24 Network ("Applicant"), Applicant's memorandum in support, and any opposition thereto, 25 26 the Court finds that the applicants meet the requirements for intervention under Federal 27 Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). 28

Accordingly, it is **ORDERED** that:

- 1. Applicant's Motion to Intervene as Defendants is **GRANTED**, and Applicants are given leave to participate as a party to this action as an Intervenor-Defendant; and
- 2. Applicant's Answer, previously lodged with the Court, is hereby deemed filed.